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Partai Keadilan Sejahtera:
A Mawdudian-Meliorist Vision of
Islamism in Post-New Order Indonesia
Abstraksi: Keil<utsertannPKS (PartaiKmdilanSejahtera) dnlnnsistempolitik
kepartainn mennndni babak baru bagi p uj alanan lslamisme di lndonesia. P KS
merupaknn genre baru Islam politik yang mrnghndirkan keuniknn-keuniknn
tersendiri dibanding dengan organisasi-or ganisasi lslamis lainnya. Namun,
dalam diri PKS adn keterlanj utan dan keterputusan ideologi Islamisme. Keter-
lanjutan Islamisme PKS dapat dilihat dnri kesalihnn ritual-indiuidunl yang
digali dnri khnsannh keagamann klasfk. yang sangat selektif. Sanuttara itu,
keterputusannya terletak padn keengganan PKS untuk mutganut paradigma
reuolusioner dalam melakukan transformasi sosial. Selain itu, PKS lebih me-
mitih terjun langsung ke arrna politik yang dianggap oleh sebaginn knlangan
Islamis sebagai tunpat kotor y ang ho;rus dii auhi.
Tulisan ini menyoroti frnomenn mutalchir ynng ditnnpilkan PKS melalui
platform dnn praktik politil<. yang berciriknn optimisme dnn kemaunn untuk
tertibat dalnmproses transformasi sosinl-polit*.. Tulisn inibuangkat dni argu-
men daffir balaDakemawn PKS melakukmt transformasi sosial-politilr. secara ew-
lusionu tidnk tnrjadi begitu nja. Kegagalnn gurerasi tun dai knlangan lslmnis
menladi slnh stu alann putting mmgfrpa PI(S memililt buganti halumt. ln
tidnk mengadopsi paradigma ranlusionu vbagaimnra dinnut kelantpok Islmnis
tninnya. Knlnngan aktiais PKs, yang pada mulanya buaml dari kelompok prnga-
jkn Tarbtyahknrnpus, "bercuai" dai mainstteam klnnistne kin. PKS memiliLt
merestorasi kebobroknn moral mnsyarakat dnn neyfrra dengan terlfuat lnngsung
dnri " dnlnm" dengan menerima demokrasi sebagai ntu-utunya aturatt mnin yang
paling mungkin bi.u dituapknn di masyaraknt plural wperti Indonesin.
Llntuk mauuju&an plntfurm politilcnya, PKS muancmtg tradisi demolcrasi
yang disesunknt dengan nilni-nilai moral-normatif yang dintutnya sendiri. Kn-
tong* aktifs partni ini hendnk menegasknn kepadn publk balrun ummnt klam
bim ruju dan ndern tntpaharus menghntcurknn fintdnnental lceagmrnnn mereka.
Paradignnkonrpromistis smacarn ini terlihat dnriprogram'ptograrnpolitil<.yang
disesunknn d*g* stntdafi good govemanc e y ang berpij ak p ada fundnnen-
fufidfrmenknalilwnindiztidtnldansosial.Inilaltyangdixbutpendekatnn"Mmndu-
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dian-meliorist", sebunJt karaktu p olitil<. y ang bmtnha membangun tanp a hnrus
ntenghfrncurkan tatanan yang sudnh ada. Kesliltnn atau wlnfistne di stu sisi,
dkawinkan dengan pragmatisme politilc., di sisi lnin. PraWil<. politik yang sana
juga ditunjuldran lklnaanul Mttslimin (IM) di Mesir, partai Refah di Turki, serta
pmtni llamas di Palatinn. Hsl senadn juga terladi di kalnngan l(risten Eropa
d"ng* kemuncalnn CLtrktifrn Democratic P arty.
Nmnun, ynng relewn untuk diangkat di sini adnlahkonteks dirumikn poli-
t[k lcknl-nasional yang melntmi kehadiran PKS dnlnm percaturan politik global
yang diwarnai sejumlah alcsikekerasanberhtar agama. Dialektika semacam ini
memnksa PIKS mer eformulnsi kembali xjumlah doktrin p olitik y nng sel"ama ini
dtpegangt oleh sebagian Islnmis dan sernpat menjadi puwt perdebatan publik
*perti lconxp N egma Islnm, pmuapan shm{ ah Islnn, Piagarn J akarta as. P ingam
Mndinalt, dnn sej misnya. Dalnn hnl metodologi pu gerakan, memnng kehndiran
P I$ b any ak diinsp ir asi oleh IM. N amun demkian, w eff M P YrS p ada al&irny a
cenderung ditentukan olehkarakter melioris pmtai ini yang akomodntif, kun-
promistis dan eHektis. IQhadirannya menjadi pmmda per cuainn dai mninstrearn
Islamisme Qutbinn-uopinn y amg cutdmtng r adikal dnn sikap tanpa kompromi
sebagai j alan menempuh perjwngannya.
Begitu pula tidak xputi gerakan Islarnivne Qutbinn-utopinn yang mengsng-
gap demokrasi dnn paham-paham modern lainnya sebagai musuh dan berhnla
modern, PKS bmtmha mengapresiasi pahmn-palam modern smncam ini vbagai
sebuah keharusan tanpa harus tercerabut dnri identitas primordinl keislamnn.
Dalam pandnngan politik PKS, tidnk adn alasan yang kunt untuk mernisahknn
Islam dari dnnolcrasi,karennpada dawrnya Islam sangat xjalnn dengan prin-
sip-prinsip dentokrasiyanguniausal sepertikeadilan dankesederajatan. Hanya
saja, PKS tidnk menghendaki pemakmnn psnerapan demol<rasi partikular yang
cocok di sejumlnh negara tertentu ke dalam struktur mnsyarakat Muslim yang
memilki karakterbtilc. yang berbeda. fuumlalt aktift PKS ber ar gumen, pemisaltan
agamadnripolitil<, justrumenghilangkanmisiprofetkajaranagaftayanghendnk
memperbaki struktur sosial"politik yang bobrok secara moral.
Dilihnt dari perspektif ini, PKS merEresurtasikan satu persilangan baru,
selflncam tempat pertemuan sejumlah pandangan keagamnan yang berbedn.
Ini berfungsi sebagai jembatan ideologis yang menghubungknn dua paham
keagamnan yang berbeda antara sejumlah organisasi sosial-politik seffMcam
Muhammndiyah dan NU yang loyalitas kamitmrnnya terhndnp dernokrasi
tidnk diraguknn lagi, dan sejumlah organsasi lslamis lainnya yang leb{h eks-
trem dalam menolak danokrasi, di sisi lain, Politik eklektik mrnjadi pilihnn
yang tidak terhindarknn. Dalam konteks ini, PKS mmernpkan pandnngan-
p andan gan p olitik dnn intelektual dari bany ak sumb er sE anj an g dap at mem-
perknya dan mernperkuatbasis intelektual gerakan,baik dnriknlangan ideolog-
intelektual internasionnl maupun dalmn negeri.
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ocio-political developments in post-New Order Indonesia
have been dominated by a growth in Islamic activism. The
multifaceted crisis created by the failures and subsequent
fall of the New Order regime provided an immediate opportunity
for Islamists to propagate the return to "pristine" Islam as a solu-
tion to the country's problems. While there has been an evident
decline in support for the establishment of an Islamic state in In-
donesia since the middle of the last century,l the wave of democ-
racy has in fact provided Islamists with greater freedom to ex-
press their ideas more openly in public. The rise of Islamist activ-
ism, many argue, has culminated in such acts of violence perPe-
trated by Muslim hardliners as the Bali bombing in 2002 and 2005,
the Marriot Hotel blast in 2003, and the Australian embassy in
2004. Some observers even argue that Indonesia has become a
haven for Muslim terrorists.z
While many 
- 
if not most 
- 
Indonesians would like to distance
themselves from Islamism, the fact of the matter is that it is a
product of Indonesia's socio-political circumstances. These circum-
stances have evidently shaped the ideological direction of some
segments of the Indonesian Muslim community, and radical ideas
have been the result. Indonesian Islam is by no means homoge-
neous; Indonesian Muslims come in all shapes and sizes, from tol-
erant, moderate, and liberal to extremely intolerant and radical.
This does not mean that there exists a vast divide between the
moderates and the radicals; while the violent measures resorted
to by some radical grouPs are widely condemned and rejected as
morally wrong by the majority, the motives which give rise to
such radical ideas and actions are generally understood and at
times enjoy tacit sympathy, even amongst Muslims who would
have to be considered "modetate."3
The term "Islamism" could be explained as follows. First, its
proponents tend to interpret Islam, based on the Qur'an and Ha-
dith (Prophet's tradition), literally. Islamists believe that Islam is
the only solution for any type of crisis faced by Muslims since it is
complete and perfect, applicable to all times and places (qalihlikulli
zamdn wa makm).4 Second, they tend to be reactive tow,ards what-
ever they perceive as corrupted, immoral, and deviant in the reli-
gion and seek to moralise it by returning to their version of Islam.
They would see the corrupted Muslim community as the field for
their call for a return to an "authentic" version of Islam on the
basis of a peaceful and persuasive approach.
5 Studin lslamika, Vol.74, No. 1,2007
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Given those characteristics, we cannot clearly distinguish peace-
ful Islamism from radical-violent Islamism. In this context, Greg
Fealy argues that Islamism cannot be placed in an isolated catego-
ry, and thus clearly demarcated from "moderate,, or "liberal',
Muslims.s Islamist views can often also be held bv ,,mod.erate,,
Muslims and can gain broad support within some mainstream Is-
lamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ula-
ma (NU). Despite their reputation as "moderate,, organizations,
some segments of these organizations are surprisingly sympathetic
to key points of the Islamists' agenda. That is why their rhetoric
can at times be remarkably similar to that of Islamist groups.6
This article seeks to analyse how one group, that is, the justice
and Welfare Party (PKS), is attempting to clean up politics from
within the political party system. This article argues that the exist-
ence of PKS has given a new but unique political nuance to the
political party system in post-New Order Indonesia. The seem-
ingly sudden rise of PKS has taken many by surprise, and it is for
this that the party has become the topic of much discourse amongst
scholars of Indonesia.
PKS: Making the World a Better Place
PKS, established on 20 April 2002 in Jakarta, is one of the new-
comers to the political scene in post-New Order Indonesia.
Nevertheless, its performance on the political stage has been quite
impressive as it achieved massive gains very quickly among Mus-
lim voters. Originally founded as "Partai Keadilan,, (Justice par-
ty /PK) on 20 july 1998, the party owes its support mainly to Mus-
lim activists in secular university campuses spread across the coun-
try.
Unlike other Islamist groups 
- 
such as Majlis Mujahidin Indo-
nesia (The Council of Indonesian Muslim Fighters, or MMI), Hizbut
Tahrir Indonesia (The Liberation Party of Indonesia, or FITT), and
Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front) 
- 
that opt for ex-
tra-parliamentarian struggles and are utopian and revolutionary
in vision, PKS is convinced that cleaning up politics can be done
from within the political party system through a step-by-step
evolution. This political vision is mainly inherited from Mawdudi,i
non-revolutionary, integrative political stairdpoint.
The attribution of PKS to Mawdudi's political vision does not,
however, mean that the party has completely adopted the ideas
of Mawdudi. PKS is not the verbatim replica of Mawdudi,s polit-
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ical standpoint. In an organizational sense, the party is very much
influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood (al-lkhwan al-Muslimnn),
especially the thinking of Hassan Al-Banna. Mawdudi's idea of
Islamic theocracy is not fully supported by PKS in the Indonesian
context. The party firmly claims to subscribe fully to democracy,
even though in practice this might not always be the case. The
similarities between PKS and Mawdudian thinking lay in the
following aspects of their respective political approaches: (1) PKS
activists consider politics to be holy and as a field of dakrnah
(preaching, propagation) and 'ibadah (worship); (2) both advocate
ideas of al-shumultyat al-Isldtn, the belief of the all-encompassing
nature of Islam as a religion (al-d-m) and statehood (al-dawlah); and
(3) the Islamization of the state in which sovereignty is for God
only, while Shariah should be implemented. Furthermore, in dis-
seminating their ideas, PKS always reinforces the use of peaceful
means.T
Meliorism, developed along the context of the debates of reli-
gious ethics in the aftermath of World War I, essentially argues
that the world can be a better place without necessarily destroy-
ing the existing socio-political orders. It basically condemns the
existing world as "a sorry state of aff.airs," and affirms with con-
fident assurance the ability of human intelligence to terminate it.
Its advocates a practical motto: "Let us make a better world!"
Meliorists are militant yet not necessarily radical in a pejorative
sense, as they do not propagate the use of violence in the Process
of social transformation. More importantly, they look at the real-
ity of the world positively.s The basic assumption of meliorism is
that:
The appearance of man was expressed in terms of struggle, and his history
was said to consist of efforts to improve his status by acquiring greater
control over the various elements constituting his environment and thus
affecting his security and well-being. Thus the emphasis was shifted from
possession to endeavour; from worship to work; from a sense of belonging to
a wider order of reality and sharing in its life and spirit to a concern for
remoulding the world wherever it thwarted desire.e
Meliorism has a lot to do with human efforts on the grounds of
religious causes; it is about wrapping up human Progress in the
world of materialism by religious spirit that distinguishes itself
from pragmatism, instrumentalism, and realism, which are secu-
lar in tone. In the minds of meliorists, religion provides a Pro-
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phetic code of conduct for its believers. In this context, religion in
general is widely perceived of as a consciousness of the highest
social values. On the other hand, being irreligious becomes a state
of indifference or hostility to that which promotes human well-
being.lo
The main mission of PKS is twofold; the first is a general mis-
sion, namely, "as a dakusah party [and] the upholder of justice and
prosperity in the framework of the unity of the ummah and na-
tion." The second is to make the party "politically influential
through participation and opinions, aimed at realizing Indonesia
as a madani [civil] society."11 The vision of the party is as follows:
L. Disseminating Islamic dakwah and developing its cadres to be-
come the element of change (andsir taghylr).
2. Developing Islamic social institutions as the centres of change
(markaz taghylr).
3. Constructing an Islamic general opinion and propitious circum-
stances for the implementation of Islamic teachings as a solu-
tion and as a blessing for the entire universe (rahmatan lil
atalnrnl.
4. Building political awareness among the society, and carrying
out the protection, service and empowerment of their rights of
citizenship.
5. Upholding consistently and continuously the "commanding
right and forbidding wrong" (amar ma'rtf nahl munkar) to the
powers-that-be in the framework of Islamic law and ethics.
6. Being active in communicating, visiting (silaturahim), collabo-
rating and reforming (islal.t) various elements of the society and
Muslim community for the sake of establishing ukhuwwah
Islamlyah (solidarity in Islam) andwihdah al-ummah (the unity of
the Muslim community), and other components of the nation
to bolster togetherness in realizing the agenda of reformation.
7. Taking part in providing a positive contribution to upholding
justice and rejecting despotism, particularly towards oppressed
Muslim countries.l2
In the 1999 elections, the party won 1,.4% of the total vote and
seven seats in the national House of Representatives (DPR). PK
emerged fuorn dakwah movements such as the Muslim Student Ac-
tion Union (Kesatuan Aksi Mahnsiswa Muslim Indonesia /KANfrvn) and
the Tarbiyah Movement.l3 Since PK did not meet the2"/" threshold
that would allow it to take part in the next election, the party
Studia Islamika, Vol. 74, No. 1,, 2007
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transformed itself into "Partai Keadilan Sejahtera." Lr the follow-
ing general election in 2004, the party achieved a remarkable in-
crease to7.34'/" of the vote and 45 seats in the DPR, an unbeliev-
able achievement for a newcomer. This means that the party was
chosen by as many as 8.3 million voters all over the country dur-
ing the 2004 elections.la The remarkable success of PKS in the 2004
elections can be put down to its strategy of downplaying Islamic
issues and instead articulating more popular and, importantly,
more secular themes during the campaigr; " Bersih dan Peduli" (Clean
and Caring).ls This theme was extended into a more eye-catching
slogan, "Clean National Leadership from Corruption and Care for
the People." Evidently the party seeks to show society in general
that the party is distancing itself from the implementation of Islamic
shari'a, something they consider less important than dealing with
the multidimensional crisis inflicting the country. On many
occasions, they even seem to avoid such controversial issues as
the implementation of sharia, which is considered to be
unmarketable to the public.
Analysing the direction of PKS has to be directly linked to anal-
ysing its manifesto and program before it transformed itself from
PK into PKS. At that time, there were seven main characteristics
of the party:
l-. Moralist; the party strives for the healing of Indonesia through
the moral values of Islam.
2. Professional; its cadres are well-prepared to master modern
science and technology before immersing themselves into the
restoration of Indonesia.
Patriotic; PK's cadres define the spirit of the struggle for the
sake of the betterment of mankind and gaining God's mercy.
Moderate; the party defines this term as choosing an in-be-
tween position, even though this attitude was objected to by
some other more puritan party's activists.
Democratic; which is defined as the capacity of human beings
to determine their own destiny which is believed to be deeply
rooted in the Islamic tradition of Shma.
Reformist, by which the party refers to any attitude towards
the betterment and restoration of society, and not vice versa.
Independent, which is defined by the party as freedom from
any form of oppression and colonialism.l6
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The manifesto (Anggaran Dasar/ AD) and program of pK differ
from those of PKS. While PK's manifesto and program did not
mention Pancasila at all, the PKS's manifesto does mention it ex-
plicitly, albeit not as the foundation [which is Islam] of the party,
but under the article of purpose. It is said that "Partai Keadilan
Sej ahter a adalah Par tai D akwah y ang bertujuan maaujudkan masy arakat
yang adil dan sejahtera yang diridlai Allah Subhanahu Wata'ala, dalam
Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang berdasarkan Pancasila" [partai
Keadilan Sejahtera is a dakusah party that aims to realize a just and
prosperous society under God's mercy, within the framework of
Unitary State of Indonesia rvith Pancasila as its foundation].rz This
statement seems to ensure that the party wishes to compromise
the two important words which have stood in diametrical opposi-
tion to each other throughout Indonesian history: Islam and pan-
casila.
As soon as PK was established, the party launched a number of
public-oriented programs which dealt with the economy, politics,
law, education, science and technology, local govemance/ society,
and womanhood.l8 Basically, there was no fundamental difference
between these programs and those offered by other political par-
ties. They were, however, given an Islamist flavour. In the field of
economics, for instance, developing a non-interest economic sys-
tem was considered as the solution for the economic crisis. In the
field of politics, moral values were given more prominence at a
practical level by promoting good and clean governErnce and pub-
Iic accountability based on Islamic precepts.
Soon after the party changed its title to pKS, the various pro-
grams were broken down into nine priorities as a solution to the
current problems faced by the country. Later on these programs
became known as the Nine'K's:
'l,.. Korupsi dan Penyalahgunaan Kewenangan (Corruption and the
abuse of power);
Kemiskinan dan Pengangguran (Poverty and unemployment);
Kebodohnn (Illiteracy or ignorance) as a result of the low quality
of education and science and technology;
Kriminalitas dan Keruwanan Sosial (Crime and social insecurity);
Konftik dsn Kekerasan (Conflict and violence);
Ker etakan N asional d.an Ancaman D isintegrasi Bangsa (National dis-
unity and the threat of national disintegration);
Ketergantunganpada dontirnsi asing @pendence on foreign domina-
tion);
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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8. Kelemahan Kep emimp inan (Leadership weaknesses);
9. Kerusaksn etikn danbudaya (Ethics and culture damages).1e
Despite its reputation as a newcomer, the roots of PKS can be
traced back to several Muslim organizations such as Dewan Dak-
wah Islam Indonesia (Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia,
or DDII) and Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (The
Indonesian Committee for World Muslim Solidarity, KISDI), or
even Masyumi. These organizations, directly or indirectly, inspired
the establishment of PK. Some even argue that the establishment
of PK marked a formal split with DDII and KISDLTo
Crafting Islamic Democracy:
The New Era of Political Islam
It must be emphasized from the outset that although PKS does
not explicitly carry the name of Islam on its name, it is considered
an Islamic party. At the time the party was established, the Tarbiyah
Movement was a closed movement whose members were carefully
selected and inducted into a program designed to ensure religious
piety. The party was founded by some of the leaders of the Tarbiyah
Movement following Soeharto's fall in 1998.2r Much of its support
came from campus-based Islamist groups and young graduates
who had been active in Tarbiyah circles. According to Anthony
Bubalo and Greg Fealy, the decision of some Tarbiyah leaders in
L99B to form PK(S) was a reaction to the freer political atmosphere
resulting from the fall of the Soeharto regime, facilitated by the
belief that it was now time to move into a new stage of
development, one that focused on formal politics and popular ap-
peal as a means of furthering their objectives.22 By the time of the
L999 election, PK claimed to have about 60,000 members. When
the party announced its re-formation under the new name PKS in
mid-2003, it already had more than 300,000 members. The party
consciously recruited members from a non-Tarbiyah background
to broaden its appeal and, at the 2004 election, fielded more than
30 non-Muslim legislative candidates.23
While Tarbiyah members regarded the Islamization of society,
the economf , and state as a cornerstone of their struggle, PKS
downplayed these issues in the 1999 and 2004 elections, empha-
sizing instead "secular" themes such as fighting corruption, socio-
economic equality and the need for clean and good governance.2a
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Party leaders made clear that their stance on these issues was in-
formed by their Islamic norms, but they usually conveyed their
electoral messages in religiously neutral rhetoric. This was not to
say that PKS leaders had abandoned their earlier commitment to
the Islamist causes; rather they argued that it was premature and
ultimately counter-productive to take such issues to the broader
electorate.2s Most voters/ they believed, had a poor understand-
ing of Brotherhood principles and PKS did not want to risk being
labelled sectarian or radical if it promoted such an agenda. Thus,
PKS's constitution and manifesto made no explicit mention of es-
tablishing an Islamic state.26
It has to be acknowledged that, to a certain extent, a democratic
element has been behind the establishment of PKS, since it was
founded on the basis of a democratic poll of over 6,000 students
and alumni of the KAMMI network.2T However, the extent to which
the idea of democracy has been appreciated by the party's cadres
and activists is another question. There are of course disagreements
within PKS as a result of the tension between Islamist causes and a
commitment to democracy. For some PKS leaders, such as Fachry
Hamzah, a former KAMMI leader, who is now a PKS member of
parliament, the party's true political objective is a state based on
Islamic law. He maintained that "Today democracy is our playing
field, but we cannot abandon our religious ambitions ."28 Onthe other
hand, this party can be seen as the bridging ground between radical
Islamists and Muslim organizations which are committed to democ-
racy.Elizabeth F. Collins and Ihsan Ali Fauzi, for instance, acknowl-
edge the party as being "a moderate alternative to radical Islam-
ism."2e This can be seen by the fact that the founders of PKS are
supporting democracy, ironically because democracy provides a way
to establish an Islamic goverrunent. They say time and again that
there is no necessary contradiction between Islam and democracy.
Hidayat Nur Wahid, the then party's chairman, who is now the
chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majlis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR), has tried to position PKS as a "cen-
trist Islamist party" that occupies the middle ground between rad-
ical Islamist groups that reject democracy on the one hand, and
Muslim organizations committed to democracy/ on the other.3o hr
his view, there is a broad variety of Islamist groups, ranging from
radical Salafi groups which are open to the use of violence to old
Masyumi activists, including those who support the Jakarta Char-
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ter and who would impose Islamic law on Muslims, to moderate
civil society groups committed to democratic values like for exam-
ple the big mass organizations Muhammadiyah and NU.31
As far as the party's formal constitution is concerned, democ-
racy is mentioned as one of the spirits of the party.32 What PKS
means by democracy is its acceptance of universal and basic val-
ues of democracy as a reflection of the capacity of mankind as
khnlifutullah (God's vicegerent) on earth to determine its own des-
tiny.33 One of the forms of democracy, that is, people's participation
in electoral politics, should be appreciated but must not go against
the basic principle of shura (deliberation, consultation). Shurais a
system dealing with how power is managed in a certain state or
society whose values are derived from the Qur'an.il
Some observers have responded positively to the performance
of PKS. Bubalo and Feaiy, for instance, praise PKS for its
achievements thus far as a positive contribution to the process of
dernocratization in Indonesia.s This party is said to have offered
a new paradigm of political behaviour and greater electoral choic-
es generating an alternative to the oligarchic structures that tend
to underpin autocratic regimes. In this regard, the role that PKS
has played is an actual demonstration of how Islamists and/or
Islamism can sometimes assist in a process of democratization. Not
all types of Islamism have a destructive effect on political life. In
their evaluation, the party's distinctiveness is a direct consequence
of its Brotherhood-derived ideology and norms. Although the
party has adapted its ideology to fit Indonesian political condi-
tions, its core frame of reference, in Bubalo and Fealy's opinion,
remains that of the Brotherhood. Viewed from this perspective, it
can be argued that this particular form of Middle Eastern influ-
ence has by and large had a positive impact on Indonesian politi-
cal 1ife.36
R. William Liddle has also praised the positive contribution
made by PKS to the process of democratization in Indonesia,
following its success in the 2004 elections. In his opinion, one of
the factors that made PKS successful on the political stage is the
fact that this party used a double-standard strategy in its
campaigns.3T As a cadre party, PKS implemented stringent religious
values and a set of moral standards to be obeyed by its members.
Interestingly, the members and activists of this party were buoyed
by the enchantment of Islamic ideology, which resulted in a strong
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commitment to maintain high moral standards in politics. The same
enchantment cannot be found in other Islamic parties or Muslim-
based parties such as PKB, PAN, and PBB. In other words, they
used religion for "in door" purposes. Outwardly, however, this
party employed a religiously neutral language, focusing on issues
such as overcoming poverty, anti-corruption, clean governance,
and distribution of justice, in order to appeal to a wider electorate.
PKS was fully aware that the use of Islamic issues such as the
application of shariah would be counter-productive and could be
rejected by the society. What the people needed was real action
how to deal with the plight of the corunon people (zuong cilik).It
took the issue of the neglectedwong cilikto be the main theme of
its political campaign to gain its high profile. It could attract the
public's attention by presenting itself as a moral reform party which
was able to distinguish itself from the political status-quo. In 2003
PKS issued a campaign statement entitled "24 Alasan PKS sebagai
Musuh Wong Licik" (24 Reasons why PKS is the Enemy of Slippery
Characters) and "15 Alssan PKS sebagai Sahabat Wong Cilik" (L5
Reasons why PKS is the Friend of Ordinary People) based on
clippings about PKS representatives who refused to be involved
in corruption. To cite just one example, in 2003 the South Sumatra
Provincial Legislature voted to disburse Rp. 7.5 billion (US$ 900,000)
from the Provincial Operating Budget to the 75 members of the
provincial legislature. Only the PKS representative refused to take
his cut. \A/hen newspapers picked up the story, the resulting scan-
dal forced the other legislators to return the money.38 This strate-
gy proved to be successful during PKS' campaign. The success of
this strategy can be seen in the marked swell of its vote in the 2004
elections, in which PKS was able to gain7.34 percent of the vote or
8.3 million votes, up from L.36 percent of the vote or 679,178 vot-
ers in the L999 election (see Tables 1 and 2 below). In Jakarta, PKS
even became the strongest party.3e The number of the party's cad-
res has increased steeply, from 5,000 core cadres and 42,000 sup-
porting cadres in1999 to 25,000 core cadres and 400,000 support-
ing cadres.ao
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Table I
Total Votes of Islamic and/or Muslim Based Parties in the 1999 election
No. Party Votes %
Seats
in DPR
1 Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) 13,336,823 LZ.OZ 5l
2. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) 11,329,905 10.72 58
J. Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) 7,488,956 7.12
4. Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) 2,069,708 L94 t3
5 Partai Keadilan (PK) r,+Jo,JoJ 1.35 7
6. PPNUI 679,r78 0.64 5
7. Others 3417,592 3.21 +
TOTAL 39,758,725 37.6t L72
Source: Final announcement of the 1999 election result by the KPU (General Elections
Commission). Total vote for the elections was 105,846,000.
Table 2
Total Votes of Islamic and/or Muslim Based Parties in the 2004 election
No. Party Votes SeatsinDPR
I Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) 1'1.,989.564 10.57 52
2. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) 9,248,764 6.15 Jtt
J. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) 8,325,020 45
A Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) 7,303324 6.44 JZ
5. Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) 2,970,487 2.62 11
6. Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR) 2,7@,998 2.M l3
Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ulama (PPNU) 891610 0.79
TOTAL 43,497,767 38.35 231
Soulce: KPU's final announcement of legislative election results, released 5 May
2004. The total votes considered legal were 113,462,4L4 of the total voters of
1,24,449,038.
Martin van Bruinessen is another scholar who has been im-
pressed by the performance of PKS. Indeed, he considers it as the
most rational and rationalized party in the Indonesian political
system 
- 
in a Weberian sense.41 While the party does not depend
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on primordial loyalties but on merit and political ideas, its leaders
are refreshingly uncharismatic, one of the important characteris-
tics of a modern party.In terms of developing democratic ele-
ments in Indonesia, van Bruinessen also praises the party as "im-
perfect democrats but perhaps Indonesia's strongest force for de-
mocratization."A2 He further argues that PKS is:
...One of the very few forces in the political arena that may seriously contrib-
ute to a gradual democratization of the country. One of the most obvious
reasons is that the party believes in participation in the existing political
system and in changing society through persuasion of individuals rather
than through grabbing power... It is not the party's theoretical ideas about
divine versus human sovereignty that will determine its democratic perfor-
mance but its acceptance of the rules of the game and the fact th;t it is
rational and rationalized organization.a3
In its practice if not in its discourse it is moderate and patient,
and it accepts pluralism as a given. PKS's political manifesto en-
dorses democracy based on popular sovereignty on principle, ex-
cept where this is explicitly in conflict with divine command. Van
Bruinessen also acknowledges PKS's openness for women to par-
ticipate equally in public life, since the manifesto explicitly includes
women among those who should be equal.
Despite its achievements/ however, PKS performances have also
drawn criticism. The double-standard strategy adopted by the
party is one of the aspects Bubalo and Fealy criticize.aa In their
opinion, PKS has frequently cultivated a public image of itself which
is basically at odds with internal discourses.as While its spokes-
persons have stressed the party's commitment to pluralism and
tolerance, PKS training documents and websites indicate a far more
militant stream of thinking among many of its branches. They also
criticize PKS's choice of legislative candidates in the 2004 election.
The most controversial of these was Tamsil Linrung who was nom-
inated by PKS in South Sulawesi despite his alleged connections to
several violent Islamic organizations, including lema'ah Islamiyah
[I), and his disrespectful reputation for financial mismanagement.
Another notorious case is one of PKS's representatives in parlia-
ment, Soeripto, a former senior intelligence officer, who was un-
der investigation for corruption during Abdurrahman Wahid's
presidency and who has gained a high profile by promulgating
inelegant conspiracy theories about Western involvement in con-
temporary terrorist acts.46
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Another of PKS's negative dimensions is the fact that the anti-
Zionist rhetoric is commonplace among many of its members/ as
are various theories regarding global schemes to subjugate Muslims.
A closer look at the curriculum used by the cadres in Tarbiyah
training reveals this tendency.az In this curriculum, there are at
least four subjects taught that could promote such thinking and
attitudes: (1) ghazw al-fikr (war of thought); (2) International
Zionisrn; (3) Disguised movements that oppose Islam; and (4) In-
stitutions that fight Islam.a8 Such a destructive attitude is mainly
derived from the essentialist approach developed within the circle
of Tarbiyah gatherings by uncritically exploiting some Qur'anic
verses without the attempts of reinterpretation. The oft-cited
textual reference in building such anti-Zionist attitudes is taken
from the Qur'an, verse 2:120, "Never will the Jews or the Christians
be satisfied with you until you follow their religion." This verse is
then arbitrarily deployed as the only framework in reading current
global politics with particular reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict
and the unilateral policies of the US.
Conspiracy theories also preoccupy the minds of some of the
party's activists. For example, Hidayat Nur Wahid's comment on
the second Bali bombing in 2005 was another absurd case in point.
Instead of considering the possibilities of another Islamic terrorist
attack, he blamed the bombings on rivalries within the local tour-
ism industry.ae It is also alleged that some of PKS's activists (or
supporters) were involved in several acts of vandalism of the head-
quarters and mosques belonging to Ahmadiyah, a sect accused of
being deviant from "true Islam" by the Indonesian Ulama Council
(Majlis Lllqma Indonesia/MUI) in October 2005.50 This is due largely
to the ongoing appeal of the ideology of physical jihad against
God's enemies, notably those non-Muslims fighting against fel-
low Muslims. Many cadres and activists argue that fighting jihad
against non-Muslims is a part of their religious duty if it is under-
taken appropriately, like for defensive purposes in a given con-
flict area. The branch leader of PKS in Ambon, Abdullah Daeng
Matta, for example, was killed in a conflict zone in April 2004 and
was considered by his fellow party members as a shahtd (martyr).s1
In a similar tone, Fuller Collins criticizes PKS as a cadre-based
closed party that has no interest in recruiting a mass following
ignorant of Islamic principles.s2 The most legendary motto is that
of Sayyid Qutb's "nakhtalittn zualakin natamayyazmt" (interaction
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with the society but not immersed in them).s3 The succession pro-
cess is also conducted in a closed and authoritarian manner be-
cause it is controlled by the Advisory Council (Majlts Shtrd), a su-
preme body consisting of several unelected respected figures.
Collins argues further that the structure of the party is not fully
democratic because the MajIIs ShurA playb a central role in direct-
ing the party. The separation of power within PKS into Majlts ShAra
and Tanfidhiyah is reminiscent of the similar system within the
political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in which the ex-
ecutive is controlled by a supreme body called uilayat-e-faqih (body
of religious clerics). This undemocratic system can sometimes un-
dermine a healthy power relation between the superior body and
the inferior one. It can lead to the absence of checks and balance
mechanisms in executing the state policies.
Similar to previous criticisms, van Bruinessen has also expressed
his concern about the subscription of some PKS leaders to the be-
lief in anti-Islamic conspiracies.sa In his opinion, PKS is clearly not
a liberal party and its vision of society clashes at some points with
liberal democratic values. He also points to the oddity as raised in
the party's documents between the shariah and democracy, some-
thing that can lead to the assumption that the party has at best
embraced the procedural elements of democracy. Doubts may also
linger as to its real views on the position of non-Muslim minori-
ties and the party's views on hudud punishments: will non-Muslim
minorities be accepted as fully equal citizens or will they be pro-
tected but essentially treated unequally? Does the party aspire to
have the hudfrd punishments enacted in a distant future? Last but
not least van Bruinessen predicts the party is unlikely ever to be-
come a big party, due particularly to its insistence on the quality
rather than the quantity of its members.ss
Having said all of that, van Bruinessen acknowledges that PKS
contributes to the process of democratization in the country.s6 One
obvious reason behind this, he argues further, is the fact that un-
like other Islamist groups/ the party believes in electoral politics
and in social transformation through gradual methods such as di-
alogue and persuasion. In addition to being moderate in practice,
if not in its discourse, the party also accepts pluralism as taken for
granted. The party's acceptance of democracy can also be seen
from its manifesto which mentions explicitly the word "democra-
cy" as one of the principles it embraces/ except where this is ex-
plicitly in conflict with divine command.sT This stance shows clear-
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ly that the party is at odds with other Qutbtan-utopian Islamists
who will always place the divine will above the will of the people,
and thus consider democracy as sinful hubris'
A far harsher criticism is expounded by Sadanand Dhume, a
former Jakarta-based correspondent of the Far Eastern Economic
Reaiew andThe AsinnWall Street lournal.In one of his columns, he
stigmatized the image of PKS as "Indonesian Democracy's Enemy
Within," a predisposition he advocated to depict the party's im-
minent threat to democracy in Indonesia.ss In an article published
in the Far Eastern Economic Reuiew, he recklessly lumped PKS to-
gether with Jama'ah Islamiyah in terms of "having subscribed to
the same fundamentally anti-modern worldview," an argument
which is empirically unfounded.se Dhume maintains that the PKS's
moderate mode was less than its strategy to avoid the backlash as
experienced by its counterpart of Egypt, the Brotherhood. He says
that "the party's leaders tend to couch their statements in ambi-
guity designed to calm Western and secular Indonesian fears while
at the same time reassuring the party's base about its goals - the
Islamization of Indonesian society with the ultimate goal of im-
posing a state based on shariahlaw."& He believes that the imple-
mentation of the seventh-century cruel punishment of Islamic
sharish is a matter of time when this party is in power' "Sooner ot
later," he goes on to argue, "Indonesia's cultural pluralism - a
cheerful acceptance of Taiwanese PoP grouPs, Japanese Hello Kit-
ty dolls and Bollywood movies - will run up against the Justice
Party's drab fidelity to Arab culture alone."61
From Political Islam to Islamic Politics:
Towards a New Paradigm
For Muslims, political activity is not to gain power but to serve the people'
Power is not an end in itself. so we aim not to twist arms or stab in the back
those who aspire to serve, but to cooperate... we do not aim to lead the nation
to poverty and backwardness' Good causes are achieved through good means' "
We will continue to campaign on a platform of fighting corruption, violence
and injustice, and to uphold Islamic values - the values that have been
abused 
- 
within a framework of national unity and integrity.62
The above statement perhaps reflects the very spirit of PKS's
identity. The party wishes to prove to the public that politics is
not necessarily a dirty area in which the Machiavellian slogan "ends
justify means" becomes the only hallmark. PKS wants to alleviate,
if not end up, the dull image of politics as an area of the morally
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deprived characters. In addition, PKS wants "to speak out boldly
in defence of moderate Islam 
- 
an Islam that upholds the sanctity
of human life, reaches out to the oppressed, respects men and
women alike, and insists on the fellowship of all humankind.,,63It
should be emphasized that such political platforms are not without
precedence. They try to draw lessons from 
- 
to borrow an Olivier
Roy term 
- 
the "failure of political Islam."e In this formula, there
is a sense of the "politicization of Islam" through the abuse of
religious symbols for the sake of certain people's interests.65 By
this formula, PKS wishes to represent itself as an antithesis to the
inability of some previous and other Islamic parties to perform
genuine and "true" Islamic politics. This inability made the
constituents lose their faith in the parties.
r/Vhat PKS seems to display on the political stage is something
different from the usual phenomenon mentioned above, as its cad-
res call it "Islamic politics."66 For some pKS cadres, ,,Islamic poli-
tics" differs significantly from "political Islam" in that while the
latter makes the power as the end destination of politics, the first
connotes politics as the field of dakwah (propagation) the purpose
of which is serving the people and empower them by means of
religious values.67 For PKS cadres, "Islamic politics,, should take
precedence over "political Islam." The politicization of'Islam must
be replaced by the Islamization of politics. Thus, the problem does
not lie over whether or not it is allowable to bring religion into
politics, but whether or not it is allowable to politicize religion.
PKS wants to go beyond religious symbols and place more em-
phasis on the substance behind them. The party's cadres believe
that Islamic tradition provides such a role model in building this
paradigm. They strongly believe that this is what the prophet
Muhammad and his Companions had done throughout his proph-
ecy in Mecca and Medina. They also believe that the golden age of
Islam under the Abbasid dynasty in the past was also inspired by
this prophetic paradigm. It is this paradigm that the party,s cad-
res time and again want to reinforce to the public. This ideal re-
quires a hard, serious and dedicated effort, and building a strong
and convincing track record as a moral and dakwah party has be-
come the priority of PKS.68 It can be said therefore that pKS is a
revised edition of the old paradigm adopted by preceding Islamic
parties which might be considered as "unfaithful,, to the restora-
tion of the state and the empowerment of the weak. It has indeed
been most often the case that when these parties were in power,
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they utilized the symbols of religion to gain as many votes as pos-
sible while they failed to remember the fate of their constituents.
It can be said that these parties took advantage of religious sym-
bols as " dagangan politik" (political trade) and positioned constitu-
ents as the victims of exploitation.
PKS has benefited from its image as a morally committed party
to end corruption and poverty.The party won sympathy from the
grass-roots by means of its down-to-earth Programs and activi-
ties. It was able to increase its vote considerably from 1,.37 percent
in the 1999 election to 7.34 percent in the 2004 election' It has to be
acknowledged that some of its voters in the 2004 election were
the floating mass, i.e., those unaligned voters who shifted their
support from one party to another between 1999 and 2004. There
are at least two main reasons why they gave their votes to PKS in
2004. First, they felt disillusioned by the factionalism and internal
conflict of interests within the parties for which they had voted'in
1999. Second, they were also disillusioned by the poor performance
of the established parties which had failed to enhance the level of
their prosperity. It seems that the constituents were concerned a
lot about their daily problems and they were fully aware that ram-
pant corruption and nepotism had brought about the crisis of the
country. Their disillusionment with the old-established parties led
to shifting their votes to another party which promised the change
they were wishing for. So, giving their votes to PKS does not nec-
essarily mean that they support the party's Islamist ideology. Rath-
er, they were motivated by pragmatic considerations, no matter
what the party's ideology might be. The people's longing for a
better life could be one of the explanations why PKS's strong show-
ing in the 2004 election.
What PKS has been attempting to do is convince the public that
it is not the same sort of party as the previous Islamic parties' It is
a new genre of Islamic party which represents a moral party par
excellence. Theoretically, that may be plausible' In reality, howev-
er, it is indeed difficult since Indonesia's political system has been
overwhelmingly occupied by corrupt practices' The main question
would be: how can PKS maintain its "moral obstinacy" if the sys-
tem is not conducive to this kind of attitude? This question has
only two possible answers. First, PKS keeps up its idealism with
the risk of being left alone by other parties. Second, PKS can loos-
en its moral standards in return for pragmatic causes while at the
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same time remaining stringent to its cadres. ThiS is of course one
of the most dilemmatic challenges the party is facing.6e Looking at
the current situation, however, it is very likely that pKS could be
trapped in a situation in which the second choice is inevitable. The
party's decision to enter a coalition with other parties to nominate
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jusuf Kalla - instead of
staying neutral after the initially supported candidate pair, Amien
Rais and Siswono Yudhohusodo, had been eliminated in the first
round 
- 
in the second round of the 2004 presidential elections is
the best case in point.70 Many assumed that this coalition epitomized
pragmatic politics par excellence as the party foresaw the likelihood
of its survival amidst an SBY-Jusuf Kalla win.71 Clearly, the party
could benefit from the ascendancy of this couple into power in
terms of the new distribution of power.
As Vali Nasr argues, Muslim democracy would most likely
emerge from the political circle, not from a scholarly circle.72 "Mus-
lim Democrats," he points out, "can begin from an Islamist point
of departure, as is the case with Turkey's AKP.. ."73 What pKS has
achieved so far seems to confirm Nasr's theoretical assumption.
The party does not have a highly sophisticated formula of what
Islamic politics comprises, but it does have a set of practical guide-
lines taken from numerous and different sources of how Islamic
politics could be executed. In doing so, PKS is to a certain extent
practicing what one may call "eclectic politics," a pragmatic atti-
tude based on the practice of selection from any sources as long as
it is considered morally 
- 
and particularly religiously 
- 
praise-
worthy. Although its main reference is Al-Banna, PKS proves to
be astute at using some respected Islamic scholars, either interna-
tional or home-grown ones, as its reference, such as yusuf Al-
Qardhawi, Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qrttb,Ta Mohammad
Natsir, Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, and so forth. The party's
cadres are eager to learn from what they might consider as pris-
tine heirs of outstanding Muslim personalities. Religiously, pKS
has learned a lot from puritanical-reformist visions. Politically, it
benefits a lot from modernist groups. It is a manufactured entity
based on its attempts at translating the ideas and discourses of
modernist and neo-modernist politics.
It seems that what lingers in the minds and hearts of PKS's
activists is the idea of "glory," more specifically of Islam as it was
in the past. The party has a road map for success to realize the
idea of glory. If the party has a chance to lead the country, it
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would launch the so-called "grand design of Indonesia"' Accord-
ing to this vision the year 2014 will mark the departure point for
the country's resurgence. This grand design was deliberated in its
first Munas (Musyawarah Nasional/National Congress) held in
Jakarta in July 2005. In 2019 it is hoped that Indonesia can be a
leading country in the world.Ts The making of such a design was
driven by a similar design made by Malaysia with its "Grand De-
sign 2O20" as a starting point of its resurgence. Tifatul Sembiring,
the current chairman of PKS, maintains that the party's Grand
Design was launched to overcome the current problems caused by
the backwardness and inferiority complex Indonesia is facing. More
particularly, the country lags far behind neighbouring countries
which have only recently become developed nations, such as
Malaysia and Thailand.T6
The Islamic State Reconsidered
The extent to which the idea of an Islamic state proposed by
PKS is welcomed seems to show the degree of inconsistency among
Indonesian Muslims. In early 2000, national opinion surveys con-
ducted in 2001-2002 by the Centre for Study of Islam and Society
at the state Islamic university in Jakarta indicate that a large ma-
jority of Indonesian Muslims supported the idea that the state
should run the nation based on Islamic principles. 6L percent of
respondents surveyed in 2001 and 71 percent of respondents in
2002 agreed "that the state should require all Muslim men and
women to abide by the shar|ah." 58 percent in 2001 and 67 percent
in2002 agreed that an Islamic government...."under the leader-
ship of Islamic authorities, such as ulama or kyai, is best for a
country like ours."77 Perhaps most disturbing is that 46 percent in
200L and 54 percent in2002 agree "that the ideals and struggle of
Islamic movements or organizations (like the Islamic Defenders
Front [FPI], Laskar Jihad, Darul Islam, and others) to implement
ttre sharlah in the government and society must be supported."78
The above findings, however, contradict the results of another
survey carried out by the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga
Survey Indonesia, or LSI) in 2006.7e This survey found that the
majority of Muslims (82 percent) are in suPPort of democracy and
that they are (83 percent) in favour of the Pancasila and the 1945
constitution.8o Furthermore, it is quite surprising to find that while
a significant portion of the respondents (78.4 percent) agreed with
the opinion that "democracy is congruent with Islam," only 8'4
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percent argued that "democracy is contradictory to Islamic pre-
cepts" and 3.5 percent were of the opinion that, "The Pancasila
and UUD 45 are contradictory to Islam."81The survey also showed
decreasing support for PKS among Muslim voters with only 4.L
percent ready to choose this party if the general election was held
on that day. The ups-and-downs in the support for PKS seem to
indicate that the party has to struggle with the changing mood of
Muslim voters and, given the LSI's survey findings above, it is
quite hard for PKS to increase its support base since it is mainly
made up of Muslim voters, at least until it shows its willingness to
adapt its policies to popular trends.
The extent to which opinion polls can be used as a point of
reference for periodic evaluation on the party's policies regarding
the aspiration for an Islamic state or the implementation of Shsriah
needs further investigation. This study cannot fulfil this task. It's
suffice to say that the issue of an Islamic state has widely been
admitted as the main trademark of PKS. In approaching the no-
tion of an Islamic state, although inspired by political insights of
some respected figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, PKS has been
undergoing a process of moderation and necessary adaptation to
the Indonesian context. The cadres of the party are well aware
that the issue of an Islamic state, based on the history of Islamic
parties in Indonesia, is a sensitive issue that can undermine its
capacity to win the minds and hearts of a larger slice of constituents.
Because of this, PKS does not mention explicitly in both its
manifesto and statutes that an Islamic state is on its agenda,
although it does mention Islam as the basis of the state.82 The cadres
of the party believe that Islam and the state are inseparable, but
founding an Islamic state is another matter. The same thing can
also be applied in relation to the application of Shariah (Islamic
law). The substance of Islam, for PKS, is much more important
than the outer shell. That is why expounding the substance of Islam,
i.e. in terms of values and norms, receives more prominence for
the party than carrying the label of Islam in its political visions.
For Hidayat Nur Wahid, the preference of substance instead of
the mere label has been exemplified by the practice of the Muslim
polity of the past, particularly by the Prophet, the Four Rightly
Guided Caliphs (al-Khulafaal-Rashidtn), the Umayyad dynasty and
the Abbasid dynasty.s3 However, Nur Wahid does not agree with
the idea of secularism in a Muslim polity, since the inseparability
of religion and the state is believed to be not negotiable. What
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matters/ in his view, is that the transformation of Islamic values in
public spheres can be assured without wasting time and energy in
never-ending debates about issues (ikhtilafl such as the form of the
state. In principle, PKS was founded "to realize a just nation-state
in line with God's consent."84 In modern terms, PKS stands for the
fight for justice and the creation of a welfare state.
Nur Wahid's view is confirmed by Anis Matta, another key
figure of PKS. In his view, as soon as the Prophet became the state
leader of the Madinah community, the state did not automatically
become an Islamic state as such. Therefore, he argues, it is simply
a waste of time debating whether or not Indonesia as the biggest
Muslim country in the world should be labelled an Islamic State as
this will simply be irrelevant to its substance. In other words, it
does not really matter whether Muslims need to explicitly pro-
claim the Islamic character of the state, because this country is
comprised of a Muslim majority. What needs to be done is not to
force the use of the label of Islam, but the transformation of the
state management under Islamic values. "If our predecessors man-
aged the country with secular principles, we in the PKS wish to
manage it under Islamic principles."8s That is why, according to
Matta, PKS will never carry on the issue of an Islamic state nor
Shariah as its main agenda. Anis Matta argues further that:
What we need to do is to present Islam in public life. We are now in the
process of building t|.e fiqh of statehood in a broad sense, which is not
textually minded. We achieve these political ways with a more substantial
spirit. For instance,.how to manage an educational institution under Islamic
principles, how to deal with economic matters based on Islamic norms; that
is what matters more. And not all of those issues can be accommodated at
the level of the debate. Rather, most of them are at the level of application.86
It is nevertheless clear that Indonesia with Islam as its basis is a
long-term political goal of PKS. It is also clear that the Mawdudi-
an-meliorist character will remain the nature of the party's activ-
ists, and it is this point at which PKS differs from other Qutbran-
utopian Islamists. PKS activists argue that giving concrete proof
that an Islamic state will guarantee a better life for Indonesia is
more critical than just debating it. Theref ore, far before the label
Islam is attributed to the state, i.e. "Islamic state," it is important
to prove that PKS cadres are capable of managing the state profes-
sionally and that the public will feel comfortable with their ascen-
dance to power. This is far more important than carrying the label
Islam, especially if at the same time the state is bankrupt or cor-
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rupt. Institutionally speaking, the label does not really matter as
long as the essence of the justice and welfare state are there.
Likewise, it does not really matter whether the Islamic sharlah
needs to be formalized in the state structure as long as the core
elements of the sharlah are well-represented in public life. This
means that a strong foundation in the community must take pre-
cedence over the application of Islamic shariah. The Islamic mea-
sures will mean nothing if they are not accompanied by a well-
preparedness of the comrriunity. In the Indonesian context, accord-
ing to Hidayat Nur Wahid, the issue of Islamic shariah law has
been often misunderstood. \ /hat is more crucial, in his view, is
how to make the shariah a promising solution which is beautifur to
enjoy by many, something practically feasible to the real condition
of Indonesia. "That is precisely what we have been struggling for,,,
added Nur Wahid.s7
Given its Islamist vision, one should be mindful of the terms
"based on Islam" or "Islamic state," since the discourse on an Is-
lamic state and shariah developed within PKS circles tend to show
a tendency towards diversity and complexity. What an Islamic
state means for the party's cadres, for instance, is not and will
never be monolithic. In this context, some PKS cadres have re-
peatedly referred to Al-Banna's construct of an Islamic state. Al-
Banna used two terms to refer to an Islamic state. The first term is
dazalah Islamlyah, which simply means Islamic state, and the sec-
ond one is isldlt al-dawlah (reformation of the state).88 Both of them
were used interchangeably by Al-Banna in referring to an ideal
state for Muslims. The reference to these terms has different im-
plications though; while the first term generates what Iran has
declared and implemented since its revolution in 1979 (i.e. the Is-
lamic Republic of lran), the second term might result in what hap-
pens in most Muslim majority countries like L:rdonesia nowadays.
The urgent need to reform the state is motivated by economic and
political crises as well as moral decay in some Muslim countries.
Overall, it seems that PKS activists are motivated primarily by the
second option in upholding sharfah-based law enforcement. They
argue that the crisis needs to be overcome by Islamic formulas as
reflected in the shariah, and thus it is not necessarily urgent to
establish an Islamic state like in the case of lran. It is isldh al-dawlah
that Anis Matta believes to fit in with the current condition of
Indonesia. He puts more emphasis on the management of the state
based on Islamic values than on the formalization of shariah. The
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reformation of the state needs to be done step by step, from the
smallest level such as the individual and family to the biggest one,
the surrounding community and the state.se
As has been mentioned earlier, PKS is concerned with estab-
lishing an Islamic state according to a Mawdudian-meliorist inter-
pretation. This approach allows the party to irtcorporate some Is-
lamic elements into the public sphere. In this perspective, it can be
said that the idea of an Islamic state in the minds of PKS cadres is
not only the continuum, but also the advancement,.of what some
modernist activists such as Zaenal Abidin Ahmad and Moham-
mad Natsir had proposed following the constitutional debate in
the 1950s.e0 These thinkers were proponents of the holistic view of
the relationship between Islam and the state and were/ thus, against
the type of secularism proposed by some of the secular national-
ists such as Soekarno, Hatta, Supomo, and others who argued that
Islam should be permeated as the spirit of politics as manifested
in "politik garam" [the politics of salt], and not "politik gincu" {the
politics of lipstick]. Whilst the first refers to how the substance of
Islam, and not the symbol, is,presented in the world of politics as
values, the latter, "politik gincr", means the opposite: symbols do
matter, more than substance. Interestingly, today PKS activists seem
to support the argument "politik garam", proposed by the 1950s
secular nationalists who argued that Islamic values should be co-
louring all activities and policies of the state as a whole. What
remains Mawdudian-meliorist is that the area of politics should
be given a sense of sacredness; life should be treated as a field of
the observation to God. Nevertheless, the idea of an Islamic state
is not a matter of formalism; it is a matter of substance.el
It is worth noting that one of the important key words to un-
derstand the political goals of PKS is "evolution." In its attempts
to implement Islamic values and shar/ah, PKS considers the exist-
ing condition of the community and the state as an important fac-
tor.e2 It will never advocate the application of Islam in the state
structure as long as there is no well-established precondition for
that. Hidayat Nur Wahid, for instance, by citing Hartono Mard-
jono'se3 statement, argues that 95 percent of the elements of Islam-
ic law can be applied at the present time. The remaining five per-
cent, comprisirrg some aspects of sharlah such as hudad (bound-
aries) and other types of punishment in Islamic law, is considered
insignificant to achieve unless the 95 percent element is upheld
consistently in public life.ea The application of Islamic law must
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consider the readiness of the society. The word evolution indi-
cates that PKS will apply Islamic law gradually based on the ca-
pacity of the Muslim community to accept it.. This implies that
there are two other key terms: the minimalsharlah and the maximal
sharfah. The application of sharlah must gradually move from the
minimal sharf ah to the maximal or 100 percent shariah, eventhough
what the latter stands for in detail is still vague.
Mutamrnimul Ula, another PKS activist who is now a member of
parliament, argues that national law can utilize Islamic law as its
main inspiration while sdst law can give a sense of locality and
Western law can function as a complement, especially with regards
to the adoption of science and technology on a practical level.es He
bases himself on three arguments: First, philosophically,Islamic law
contains in itself the spirit of justice. In addition to being a value
system, Islam, he believes, is a methodology (minhafi of how to
achieve it. Unlike other nations which might have the same value
system as Islam such as justice, harmony, discipline and peace, they
do not have the same methodology as Islam has to achieve it. What
is meant by the methodology is a sub-value system which under-
pins the value system.e6 Second, he also claims that Islamic law is
the most detailed judicial system compared to other systems in the
world. Third, sociologically, the majority of Indonesian society
chooses Islam as their religion. Islamic law, in his opinion, has for a
long time been a living law in the heart of the society.eT
In order for the efforts to apply Islamic law to be successful, it
is important for PKS to disseminate and propagate Islam to the
society. In doing dakzuah, the party's cadres tend to avoid or
withdraw themselves from issues which can stimulate public debate
over religious matters (khilafuah). They gained a high profile for
their quick response to human disasters in several areas in
Indonesia. They were, for example, first on the spot at the location
of disasters such as the 2004 tsunami disaster in Aceh and North
Sumatra, when they sent an expedition called "Operasi Uhud" 
- 
a
word taken from a war waged by the Prophet Muhammad, the
Battle of Uhud.e8 With activities like these they ensure that the
party can maintain its profile as a workers' party. Given this
strategy, they believe that there is no khilafiyah in God's law.
It remains unclear, however, whether PKS would some day
endorse the application of cutting hands for theft in criminal law,
even though this punishment is spelled out explicitly in the Qur'an.
What seerns to be clear is that PKS does not want to force itself to
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be involved in a public debate over whether or not this type of
punishment can be applied in the context of Indonesia. Doing so
could undermine the positive image of the party.It should also be
acknowledged that within PKS there are basically two mainstreams:
the camp that agrees with the application of Islamic law in its very
literal sense, and those who advocate the substantiation of Islamic
law. It seems that the idea of the compatibility between Islam and
democracy is propagated by the second camp.
It is therefore very important to note that the issue of shariah
implementation is a hotly contested concept within PKS. A careful
analysis of the viewpoints proposed by some of the party's top
cadres and activists seems to confirm the diverse propensity of
what the shariah means and how it should be implemented at a
practical level.ee This is a direct implication of the rich and hetero-
geneous nature of Islamic legal schools in Islam, even though the
majority of Indonesian Muslims embrace the Shafi'ite legal school.
As a consequence, it is no wonder that the meaning and scope of
shariah is very broad. What is monolithic is the fact that all PKS
cadres advise that Islamic law be applied in all aspects of life, from
the individual level to state level. However, they disagree with
one another in what forms and ways tii.e shariah should be ap-
plied. Due to this reason, the leadership of the party 
- 
not only in
the Tanfidhiyah (executive body) but also in the Majlis Suro 
- 
is a
very crucial factor in determining to which direction the issue is
likely to go.100 If the party's rank and file do understand the
complexity of Islamic law implementation, thenthey mightbe more
prudential in the dissemination of information and in advocating
the issue. Hidayat Nur Wahid can be included in this group of
leaders. Under Nur Wahid's leadership, PKS tended to perform
more on pragmatic issues 
- 
as repeatedly mentioned above 
- 
rath-
er than the Shariah issue. He realized that putting more emphasis
on the latter issue would be counter-productive for the purpose
of widening its constituency.
The Legacy of Masyumi
Most PKS activists and cadres are relatively well-educated with
secular campuses as their centre of activity.1ol Even though most
of them are not deeply learned in Islamic knowledge, they are
fully committed to searching for and implementing what they
believe to be authentic Islam, a version of religion that is
presumably inherited from the pious predecessors. It can be said
Studia Islamikn, Vol. 14, No. 1,2007
30 Masdar Hilmy
tnlat the existence of PKS is a continuum of previous Islamic polit-
ical parties such as Masyumi.1o2 Nonetheless, PKS is not a replica
of Masyumi; rather, it is a revised version of Masyumi, a then-
Mohammad Natsir-led political party, himself as the colleague and
adorer of Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi.103 On the basis of the spirit of
learning from the past, PKS activists want to improve the
performance of Masyu*i by, amon€i others, swaying the pendulum
of politics into a more compromised way to the centre of power.
This attitude was proven by its willingness to form a coalition
with other political parties or the ruling government, regardless
of prevailing differences in ideology.
Viewed from a historical perspective, Masyumi was an Islamic
party that was generally antagonistic towards the strongest party
of the time, the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia/Indonesian
Nationalist Party).104 Despite its Islamic orientation, Masyumi was,
especially in the 1950s, one of the few Indonesian parties that
adhered to Western ideas of democracy. Today, Natsir can be
seen as one of the most influential figures in the formation of PKS'
Islamism. Many of the founders of PK[S] were disciples of Natsir
and Buya Malik Ahmad, another influential figure of Masyumi.los
To these activists, the figure of Natsir represents an enduring legacy
to the making of the intellectual character of PKS. Natsir, through
his Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia [DDII], has made
considerable attempts to translate the thoughts and ideas of Al-
Ikhwan al-Muslimun, which are now readily accessible to PKS
cadres and activists in secular campuses.106
Basically, PKS activists are the reincarnation of Masyumi, at
least at a symbolic level.107 Nevertheless, unlike the older generation
of Masyumi, the better political environment of today in which
PKS activists live marks different viewpoints to that of Masyumi.
As is well-known, Masyumi activists had to put up with political
repression and marginalization by the government. Conversely,
PKS activists can exercise their political activities freely. In fact,
they are part of the government today. The political activism of
PKS began when the New Order government shut down campus
activism in the early 1980s. Many Muslim students tried to adopt
the Muslim brotherhood's methods of spreading Islamic moral
values by using cells (usroh) led by a trainer (murabbt>). When the
New Order regime collapsed, they started to rethink their strategy
and began to make their activism accessible to a wider audience
by establishing Partai Keadilan (PK). To a certain degree, the in-
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clusion of PKS activists into the prevailing political system can be
seen as a form of political participation from educated Muslims
previously marginalized by the New Order. The phenomenon of
PKS, thus, represents a process of social mobilization among young
educated Muslims into the public sphere, rather than merely a
continuation of an ideological struggle.
Although PKS leaders readily pay homage to the role of DDII
and former Masyumi leaders, it does not mean that they are not
critical of some religious standpoints propagated by the latter.
Some of them even question the relevance of the Masyumi legacy
for modern-day Indonesia by arguing that the approaches of
Masyumi and DDII are outdated. Mutammimul 'Ula, for instance,
argues that the Masyumi legacy is no longer feasible in a present-
day context because of the irreversible change of history and po-
litical models.1o8 Fachry Harrrzahi another PKS leader, argues in a
similar tone that PKS is not Masyumi in its thinking. He even goes
a step further, belittling PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang/Moon and
Crescent Party) as "Masyumi nostalgia.r/r0e fu[2ny in PKS feel that
the DDII's heavy emphasis on matters pertaining to "external
threats" to the Islamic community such as Christian campaigns to
convert Muslims and American-Jewish conspiracy theories to un-
dermine Islam and the Muslim ummah should not be regarded as
important priorities in PKS' political struggle. While such views
would be shared by many in PKS, they are not prominent in the
party's discourses in general. PKS activists prefer to place greater
emphasis upon the development of the personal piety of Muslims
and are more responsive to issues such as inter-religious respect
than their counterparts in DDII.110
Between the l$adinah Charter and Jakarta Charter
The PKS' subscription to the Madinah Charter (MfthAq al-
Madlnah), instead of the Jakarta Charter, has been one of the most
important but controversial breakthroughs in the development of
Islamic political ideas in Indonesia.lil It was an important depar-
ture because most Islamist groups favour the inculcation of the
legendary seven words of the Jakarta Charter ("with the obliga-
tion of the Muslims to practice the Islamic sharlah") into the pre-
amble of the 1945 constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar [UUD]
1945).It was controversial because its counterparts accused the
party of having betrayed the struggle for the implementation of
the sharfah. In response to that, Some PKS leaders asserted time
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and time again that the party's formal policy against the Jakarta
Charter reflected the party's commitment to pluralism. As far as
its formal manifesto was concerned, the party did not have any
intention of establishing an "Islamic state" in a conventional sense.
In Hidayat Nur Wahid's opinion, the Madinah Charter has been
the inspiration based upon which a modern "masyaraknt madani"
(civil society order) yas going to be established.ll2 Under the Chhr-
ter, he argued, all elements of the Madinah society proved to be
able to coexist peacefully. He went on to argue that the Prophet
has never labelled what he achieved in Madinah as an "Islamic
state."113 Nevertheless, the Prophet did establish the foundations
of a modern nation-state, which was even considered too modern
for his era.114 It is no wonder that three out of four of the Guided
Caliphs were later on assassinated for their failure to bring about
a peaceful social transformation into a modern society.
To a certain extent, the PKS's subscription to the Madinah Char-
ter could be criticized, due in part to the fact that it is not spelled
out explicitly in its statutes. One may argue that the Charter has
been omitted for tactical reasons as there is basically no point of
mentioning it specifically if it can be used whenever necessary
without actually spelling it out in the statutes. The party's cadres
seem to be aware that an inclusion of the Madinah Charter in the
party constitution could put the party at risk of losing support
from those who aspire to the Jakarta Charter. At the same time it
is also noteworthy that the current party statutes feature words
like Pancasila that were not spelled out initially when the party
was still called PK. This refusal to commit to Islamist terms may
be regarded as a tactical gamble, but it can also be seen as a sign of
the party's appreciation of pluralism in a broader sense.
Viewed from its statutes, vision and mission, it seems that PKS
wishes to integrate religious values and Indonesian cultural be-
liefs into a single coherent national identity. As explained above,
its political vision has been inspired mainly by the integrative-
holistic school of political thought of such thinkers as Abu al-A'la
al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna, Yusuf al-Qardhawi,
and Mohammad Natsir.11s According to these Muslim scholars,
Islam is a holistic religion dealing not only with worldly matters,
but also with the life of here-after; Islam is a religion ldinl and a
state ldaznlah] altogether, although the various thinkers differ over
how this paradigm should be implemented. This paradigm may
influence 
- 
either directly or indirectly 
- 
the party's political world-
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views, i.e., how PKS approaches politics from the perspective of
this holistic paradigm. Its general vision, for example, says that
PKS serves " as a dakwah party to uphold justice and prosperity in
the framework of Muslim unity and state.'/116 By and large, they
are morally self-sufficient in terms of religious values and are pre-
pared to transform the surrounding society in accordance with
these values. In its mission, for example, it is clear that the word
taghylr (change, transformation) has a particular emphasis in the
course of social encounters and interaction with the society. Its
basic principle is that they are ready to get involved in social in-
teractions but they will not lose everything. This is in line with the
legendary motto borrowed from Sayyid Qutb: "nakhtalitrm walakin
natamayyazfin" .LL7
In response to pluralism, it seems that PKS is more attracted to
the idea of a "melting pot,"118 rather than a "salad bowl,"11e soci-
ety. \A/hile in the latter type of society it is assumed that the social
interaction can result in an acculturation, where Islamic values are
ready to integrate with a new and different genre of cultural iden-
tity, the former refers to the condition where social interactions
will only result in the confirmation of Islamic values over the oth-
ers. If the latter can risk losing some elements of what they be-
lieve as Islamic, the first only adheres to the paradigm of monoc-
ulture, that is, Islamic culture. It is more often the case that the
Islamic values are expected to win the process of the "cultural bat-
tle" because Islamists do not want to lose anything. The party's
cadres usually have a tacit knowledge that they are practicing an
"Islamic personality" par excellence, which is assumed to be supe-
rior to other personalities. As a case in point, there is hardly any
PKS cadre who will be found smoking. In a country where smok-
ing is almost second nature, this is a remarkable phenomenon. For
committed PKS members, smoking is not only bad for personal
health, but also theologically illicit in Islam.120
Despite the fact that the PKS statute clearly states that the par-
ty is based on Islam, Pancasila is mentioned under Chapter 2fPur-
pose and Effortl and article 5 [Purpose] which says: "Partai Keadi-
lan Sejahtera is a Dakwah Party whose purPose is to realize a just
and prosperous society under the consent of Allah within the frame-
work of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia which is
based on Pancasila."l2r It is clear that there is a sense of compro-
mise, even ambiguity, between the party's foundation of Islam on
the one hand, and the widely-accepted platform of Pancasila, on
Studin lslamika. VoI. 14, No. 1,2007
34 Masdar Hilmy
the other. Nonetheless, Tifatul Sembiring, the current chairman of
the party, argues that the era of dominance of Pancasila as the sole
philosophical foundation for political parties is over, as it was a
part of Soeharto's New Order, which was brought down in the
late 1990s. However, he points out that the formula of Pancasila is
not clear enough.122 That is why PKS wants to break the idea of
pluralism down into a more concrete concept by referring to the
spirit of the Madinah Charter. If the party is given a chance to
lead the country, he says, it will make all elements of society prosper
without exception. All citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims alike,
are equal before the law. This is inspired by the Prophet's saying
"whoever oppresses non-Muslims without any due reason, he/
she will be my enemy in the hereafter."123 As a party which claims
to be faithful to democracy, PKS wishes to give the same chance to
everybody, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.12a
That the attitude of PKS towards democracy is somewhat am-
biguous became visible for the first time in the year 2000 when the
pafty's MPR fraction, which at that time was aligned to Amien
Rais's PAN in the so-called Fraksi Reformasi (Reformation Fraction),
voted against the amendment of Article 29 of the constitution.l2s
The amendment was proposed by several Islamic parties including
PBB and PPP, who aspired to the formalizationof Sharf ah through
the incorporation of the Jakarta Charter.126 As PKS rejected the
Jakarta Charter, the party was accused by the other Islamic parties
of having betrayed its commitment to the implementation of the
Shnriah.In response, PKS raised the issue of the Madinah Charter
as its political platform.l27 Basicall/, the Charter contains, among
others, a declaration that the whole Madinah community,
regardless of the religious beliefs of its individual members, was
regarded as a single community (ummah wahidah). Therefore, each
member of the community was obliged to help, protect and respect
the other and was given freedom to observe his/her religion.
Despite the pluralist appearance of the Charter, however, some
critics have accused PKS of employed it as a tactical means of " rear-
door politics.'/128 They assume that Nur Wahid hides behind the
universal values of the Charter to mask PKS's genuine ambition to
establish an "Islamic state."
This accusation, however, has been rebutted by Untung Wa-
hono, one of the party's leading cadres.l2e In his column published
by the leading Indonesian daily Kompas Wahono asserted that such
an accusation is academically and empirically unfounded. The ac-
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cusation itself was appreciated in terms of freedom of expression,
but according to Wahono, Burhani - the author of the critique -
used some inaccurate data to justify his assumption' The first as-
pect Wahono expounded was regarding the Jakarta Charter when
he said that during the debate there emerged three positions to-
wards the issue of amending Article 29 of the UUD 1945. The first
was represented by those who wanted the article not to be amend-
ed. ThL second position was held by those who aspired to the
inculcation of the Jakarta Charter into the article with the addi-
tional phrase: "The Oneness of God with the Obligation of every
Muslim to practice Shnriah." The third was formulated by those
who aspired to amending the article with the additional phrase
"The Oneness of God with the obligation of every citizen to ob-
serve his/her own religion." The second group included the PPP
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/United Development Party) and
PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang/The Crescent Moon and Star Party). It
was simply not true - according to Wahono - that PKS was in the
same boat with these two Islamic parties, pioneering the imple-
mentation of the Jakarta Charter during the debate in the MPR'
He maintained that the policy of PKS had been achieved through
a long process of internal debate and deliberation. The result was
that PK, as the party was still called at that time, was a proponent
of the third position, together with PAN.130
There were three arguments as to why PKS proposed the Ma-
dinah Charter, instead of the Jakarta Charter, to be the main in-
spiration of any amendment. First, it was to uphold the religious
values espoused by the Preamble of the UUD 1945. Second, it was
to emphasize the equal position of religions in Indonesia. In a
bayanat (explanation) leaflet disseminated by the party at that time,
PKS illustrated how the impact of the Torah and the Bible for the
Jews and Christians respectively."t By proposing the additional
phrase "with the obligation of every citizen to observe his/her
own religion," PKS felt that the spiritual life is properly appreciated
in a religious country such as Indonesia. It was also obvious that
PKS had never proposed the Jakarta Charter during the process
of amendment of the UUD 1945, argued Wahono.132
The reference made by PKS to the Madinah Charter should, in
Wahono's view, be respected not only as a Proportional Process/
but also as a democratic choice which is guaranteed by the consti-
tution. "Democratization of reference," as Wahono called it, had
been a product of the reformation process in Indonesia since 1998
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which was signified by the nullification of the pancasila-minded
dogma as the sole foundation of the country. The old tradition of
politics exemplified by a totally uniform and naive attitude to-
wards different ideas and struggles to achieve interests, in his
view, was out-dated. Therefore, the accusation that pKS has been
practicing a "rear-door strategy" was historically, politically and
ethically baseless. As wahono has argued convincingly, pKS is
ready to take part in the democratization process on the normal
political stage, where it interacts with any kind of societal element,
in any form.133
Concluding Remarks
what can be drawn from the above explanation is the very fact
that PKS is one of the very few Islamic parties which seek to craft
their own tradition of democracy based on day-to-day politics
and down-to-earth policies and programs. The party's leadlrs and
members incessantly attempt to convince the public that Islamism
is not necessarily akin to what many describe as radical Islam which
is at all times hostile towards real politics and democracy. As a
variant of the Mawdudian-meliorist approach, what they are try-
ing to exhibit is something that seems to be pecuriar to the minds
of many: pietism or salafism on the one hand, coupled with polit-
ical pragmatism on the other. while this is nothing new in dis-
courses of sociology, its existence in Indonesia deserves extra ap-
preciation as it gives rise to a "new brand" of Islamic politics. pKS
seeks to challenge the mainstream worldview 
- 
especialy held by
the Qutbian-utopian Islamists 
- 
that politics is a dirty area and, as
a result, would be the grave for religious values. what needs to
be done is, in their holistic Mawdudian-meliorist conception, the
creation of a sense of the sacred to the territory of politics. They
also wish to. argue against the Qutbian-utopian Isrimists' belief
that Islam is, by definition, incompatible with democracy. They
believe that there is no reason to contradict the idea of Islam to
democracy, because Islam is in itself democratic. Hence, there is
no reason to separate religion from politics.lil
Viewed from its vision, PKS represents a new juncture, a sort
of meeting angle of different outlooks. It serves as a bridging
ground between Islamic social organizations such as Muhammad-
iyah and NU, whose commitment to democratic values is unques-
tionable, and other more extreme Islamists such as HTI and MMI
who firmly reject democracy. Eclectic politics is an inevitable choice
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within such a context. The predication of PKS upon the Mawdudi-
an-meliorist approach does not compel it to pledge its allegiance
solely to Mawdudi's political and religious outlooks. Rather, the
party seeks to perform an oPen-minded mode in a way that an
intellectual dialogue with other elements of society is necessary to
make Indonesia more modernized. In this context, the party adopts
many intellectual viewpoints from different sources as long as they
help enhance the soft power of the party. Therefore, it i.s not
surprising that its Mawdudian-meliorist mode is coupled with oth-
er elements from Sayyid Qutb, Yusuf Qardhawi, Hasan AI-Banna,
as well as some nationally respected figures such as Mohammad
Natsir of Masyumi/DDII, Nurcholish Madjid and Amien Rais, to
name but a few.i3s What is certain is the fact that those figures,
except Qutb, are all proponents of the compatibility between Is-
lam and democracy. It seems clear that within the party lies a spir-
it of reinvigoration of the old paradigm with the new one/ rePre-
senting a bridge between the traditional view on Islamic politics
and the revised modern one. Just like many other religion-based
organizations, PKS is enmeshed in a never-ending rumble in which
thJ process of finding its own identity is at stake. Theologically
,p"ukit g, the worldviews of PKS are drawn mainly from the teach-
ings of *lufir* such as keeping the purity of faith and moral val-
uei such as sincerity and the like. Politically speaking, it is ob-
sessed. with the idea of self-glorification as it emerged in the Golden
Age of Islam. They mostly believe that Islam will assume Power/
ur,d| d.r" to this reason, they are preoccupied with the idea that
they must be the leader of the world civilization, rather than a
follower.
PKS comprises those activists who opt to the parliamentaty way
of struggle rather than the extra-parliamentary, especially on the
groundithat the struggle from within could be more feasible than
in external one. One of the most basic underlying assumptions is
that any transformation process needs a Power structure in order
to be successful. Interestingly, however, PKS might follow what
Shakespeare has uttered: "what's in a name," in that Islamic politics
should not necessarily carry an Islamic label. This could be a tactical
choice in order to increase its secular support base. In doing so,
the party employs a double-standard strategy. Inwardly speaking,
it imposes siringent Islamic moral standards on its cadres and
activlsts, whereas to its external environment it deploys a
religiously neutral and down-to-earth language with a focus on
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anti-corruption and good governance, war against poverty and
injustice, simple life style and self-discipline, and pluralism.
Amidst the configuration of Islamic political parties in Indone-
sia, the party seems to occupy an in-between position. on the one
hand, it represents the "moral stubbornness,, of an Islamist move_
ment whose aspiration is to make God's values available to the
public sphere. on the other hand, the party is entrenched with an
attachment to the modern aspects of life. As a result, democracy is
inevitable as a way to signify that the party is modern by nature,just as Islam is believed to be as well. To be a true Muslim does
not necessarily mean to leave democracy or vice versa. put differ-
ently, one can be a Muslim and a democrat at the same time.136
Whether this promising rhetoric can be proven right, however,
remains uncertain. while stressing its democratic credentials on
the surface, it remains uncertain whether the party will really be
able to produce a genuine identity for Islamic democracy. Doubts
remain whether the party can accept democracy in a liberal sense
as long as its cadres and activists argue that they are crafting a so-
called "Islamic democracy," a..d not liberal democracy. As some
observers have pointed out, PKS's acceptance of democracy is
considered as merely a strategy to win votes.137 By the time they
are in power, they will harness democracy as a mechanism to impose
undemocratic elements of religion into society.
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